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Abstract
The UK Ministry of Defence has invested heavily in acquiring equipment under Urgent Operational
Requirement (UOR) procedures. These enable accelerated procurement to fill urgent capability
gaps. However, the dominance of time over cost and performance has led to sub-optimal logistics
support that has manifested itself in poor system availability, and in support arrangements that do
not represent best value-for-money. This paper describes experiments for improving support to
UORs, using a range of modelling and simulation tools. The results indicate that there is utility in
using general purpose, costing, and inventory optimization tools, in conjunction with each other.
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1 BACKGROUND
1.1 The Acquisition of UK Defence Equipment:
Two Differing Approaches
The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) spends around £6
billion a year on equipment, and a further £5 billion
supporting it when in service [1]. In procuring and
supporting this equipment through life (what the MoD
terms acquisition) it adopts a phased project lifecycle
known as the CADMID cycle (Figure 1) which it
introduced in 1999 under the Smart Procurement
Initiative.
Figure 1: The CADMID Equipment Lifecycle.
In planning for the acquisition of equipment, the MoD
uses scenario modelling, analysis of the outputs of
research programmes, and whatever it can draw
from operational experience. Inevitably, there is
considerable uncertainty in this: ‘In an unpredictable
security environment with constrained resources,
planning is complex and involves a high degree of
operational judgement’ [2]. In addition, the CADMID
cycle can be a very drawn out affair: in his 2009
Review of Acquisition, Bernard Gray found that the
average equipment programme overran by 80%, or
circa 5 years [3]. Some equipment therefore enters
service many years after its envisaged purpose was
first endorsed. This leads to situations where the
capability of equipment fielded on operations falls
short of what operational reality (enemy tactics,
hostile terrain etc) demands. In essence, an
operational capability need manifests itself during
current or imminent military operations which
planning has failed to anticipate. Alternatively, the
right equipment is in fact being procured but is still in
the C, A, D, or M phases of CADMID and is not yet
ready to be fielded. The solution to this problem is to
fill the resultant capability gap as rapidly as
practicable using what the MoD calls the Urgent
Operational Requirement (UOR) process. This
involves the accelerated procurement of new or
additional equipment, or the enhancement of existing
equipment, within a timescale that cannot be met by
the normal CADMID lifecycle [4]. Recent operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan have emphasized the
importance of UORs to UK Defence, and their cost:
between 2002 and Spring 2011 the MoD spent £6.8
billion on UOR acquisition [5].
Given the urgency of need in a UOR acquisition,
speed of procurement and fielding is fundamental to
success. To qualify as a UOR it must be
demonstrated that the equipment can be procured in
time to make a contribution to the operation. This
usually demands that it be procured and deployed
within 12-18 months, much quicker than is usually
achieved in a conventional CADMID acquisition. It
must also be unique to an approved theatre of
operations, which means that its in-service life may
be much shorter than a more conventional CADMID
project. The decision to terminate a UOR, or
alternatively to transfer it into general service as
contingent capability, is a deliberate and often difficult
decision. HM Treasury (HMT) will usually only fund
sufficient UOR equipment numbers for operational
use and pre-deployment training.
1.2 The Problem: Operational Availability
The urgent requirement and the restrictions on
purchase quantities make it essential that the
equipment, once procured and fielded, is available to
the front line user in the quantities, and at the time
and place, that operations demand. Unfortunately,
the levels of operational availability of UORs have
suffered. For example, the availability of the Mastiff
Protected Patrol Vehicle in Afghanistan was, on
average, 23% below the MoD’s target between
February and October 2008. Another UOR, the
Vector patrol vehicle, achieved availability levels on
average below 60% [6].
1.3 The Problem: Value-For-Money Support
UORs can come at a cost premium, lacking cost-
effective support solutions, and being more
expensive to operate than equipment procured under
normal CADMID processes [7]. The MoD is
nonetheless clear that value-for-money
considerations are important for a UOR acquisition
[8]. However, it also recognizes the lack of
understanding of support costs across the
Department [9], a failing the National Audit Office
(NAO) has also highlighted. They tried to track the
movement of spare parts through the supply chain to
Afghanistan but were unable to collect information on
costs – of parts, storage, or transport. The cost data
was unobtainable, leaving them to make the
somewhat profound observation that: ‘This
information gap means that supply chain
management decisions cannot be informed by cost
considerations’ [10].
2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
In addition to the lack of understanding of support
costs, it is apparent that UOR support failings,
manifested in variable and often significantly reduced
operational availability levels, are an inevitable result
of the UOR process. There are also many other
logistics challenges and factors associated with
military operations and the military supply chain that
are significant. The principal objective of the work
described in this paper, was to evaluate the
contribution that modelling and simulation could
make to helping the MoD address these support
failings and wider supply chain factors, thereby better
managing the risks that are inherent in the UOR
process. To achieve this objective required a realistic
and credible UOR support model to be built and a
variety of simulation experiments to be conducted.
3 THE UOR SUPPORT PROBLEM - FACTORS
3.1 Trade-Off and Resultant Support Risk
In a UOR acquisition, of the time, cost, and
performance variables, time is the most significant.
According to Gray: ‘Time is absolutely the dominant
factor’ [11]. This brings with it risk, which the MoD
accepts, recognizing that it is the level of acceptable
risk that differentiates equipment acquisition via UOR
procedures from standard acquisition. It accepts that
the accelerated timescale of a UOR procurement
often leads to delivery of ‘the 80% solution’ but
cautions its acquisition staff to ‘temper the
requirement to expedite delivery with the need to
ensure supportability’ [12]. The Defence Support
Review team advised similar caution, accepting that
a UOR should not be delayed by deliberations over
support, but stressing that it should be supportable in
the near term [13].
Inevitably many UOR procurements are off-the-shelf
buys, because there is insufficient time to design and
build a solution from scratch. This has led to:
‘…bespoke support solutions and disparate fleets
with the attendant operational and logistics
implications’ [14]. It is usually the case that the MoD
integrates additional equipment (e.g. additional
armour) onto off-the-shelf purchases in order to make
them fully compliant with the UK’s operational
equipment specifications. This adds further support
complexity.
3.2 Provisioning, Forecasting, and Supply Chain
Pipeline Failures
The NAO identified that of the highest priority materiel
demands (classed as ‘Priority 01’) submitted
between June 2007 and November 2008, only 45%
from Iraq and 59% from Afghanistan achieved the
stipulated target times [15]. Over the period 10th
December 2009 to 8th December 2010, only 35% of
Priority 01 demands met the target time to
Afghanistan [16]. It attributed these failures to two
causes: pipeline failure, and provisioning failure. The
former it described simply as being a failure to
transport the item in the time stipulated. The latter
meant ‘… the Department has no stock or a lack of
visibility has required a manual search in order to
locate it…’ [17]. Alternatively, the item was not ready
to be transported to the operational theatre because
the demand had not been forecasted, the
manufacturer was not under contract to deliver the
items within the specified time, or did not have the
item in stock [18]. Of the two, the NAO assessed the
dominant cause to be provisioning failure.
The incoherence of the MoD’s logistics information
systems [19] [20] exacerbates the problem. Whilst
the MoD tries to hold the right type and quantity of
buffer stocks in theatre to allow for supply chain
disruptions and for fluctuations in demand, this
incoherence makes this very challenging [21]. The
Defence supply chain pipeline is also prone to
disruption from a variety of causes, including: attack
by enemy forces; customs and police interference at
border crossings; and natural events, such as the
Eyjafjallajokull Volcano eruption in Iceland.
The MoD transports spares utilizing either air or
surface movement assets. A combination of failing to
forecast spares demand, and the pressure to deliver
urgent spares to the operational theatre quickly, has
resulted in the MoD making excessive use of the
faster, but much more expensive, air transport option.
The NAO summarized the issue: ‘… improving the
Department’s forecasting ability is a key requirement
for it to be able to increase efficiency, by reducing
stocks kept in theatre and through greater use of the
slower but cheaper surface routes’ [22].
3.3 Recent Initiatives
In an attempt to deliver a predictive capability to the
planning of inventories and the locations in which
they are held in Afghanistan, and to optimize these
inventory holdings, the MoD has introduced the
concept of the Control Tower. This is a virtual
organization which acts as a single MoD focal point,
in order to better plan, prioritize, and coordinate the
movement of stocks to theatre. A complementary
facility is the Force Primary Depot which has been
erected in Camp Bastion. Its purpose is to: support
the optimization of theatre stock holdings; balance
the cost of inventory versus the cost of movement;
and improve data availability and analysis.
3.4 Operational Usage, Engineering and
Configuration Evolution
The time imperative, and funding procedures, often
result in UORs being procured and deployed in
increments. Successive tranches may reflect
changes in design, and in maintenance and support
requirements, driven by the user having identified
operational capabilities in the UOR system different
to those originally envisaged. In this sense the User
has realized the UOR’s ‘capability potential’. This
process of evolution has operational benefits [23], but
the result is an increase to the range of spares and
the maintenance burden. The operational usage that
a UOR is put to may have a significant effect on its
supportability, particularly when that usage changes
significantly [24] [25]. For illustration: the poor Mastiff
vehicle availability in Afghanistan in 2008 was
primarily because of a shortage of key spares, this in
turn being the result of a change of usage from on-
road protected transport vehicle in Iraq to an off-road
pseudo assault vehicle in Afghanistan. ‘Once used
off-road, the spares level proved inadequate: for
example the deployed fleet of 87 Mastiff vehicles
consumed an additional 176 axles between
December 2006 and January 2008’ [26].
3.5 Environmental Factors
The operational theatre’s geography and weather
can be significant. Reporting on support to
helicopters, the NAO observed that greater engine
and rotor blade performance was required in the thin
air of Afghanistan, and that ‘When the sand and dust
mixes with oil it becomes a grinding paste, rapidly
eroding internal parts; rotor blade and engine lives
can be between 75 and 83 per cent shorter when
compared to activities in the United Kingdom’ [27].
3.6 Commercial and Contracting Practice
UOR equipment is often quite specialist. For
example, some unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
manufacturers are small companies with limited
production capacity. As a result the pool of spares
available globally is small and the UK has to compete
for these spares with the other nations operating the
same equipment types [28].
MoD commercial officers are directed to exercise
commercial astuteness whilst contracting for UORs.
Ideally, MoD project teams procuring UORs need to
be able to enter into contracts for support which are
sufficiently flexible to permit their termination at short
notice. This requirement, together with the fact that
short term extensions to UOR lives may have to be
approved incrementally, calls for ‘… exceptional
commercial judgement to balance costs against the
need for contractual flexibility’ [29]. The challenge of
exercising commercial astuteness must be
considered in the context of a trend for industry
contractors to deploy forward to provide depth
maintenance in theatre, rather than in the UK. This
concept, which MoD refers to as forward depth, is a
strong theme in support contracting.
3.7 Strategy, Policy and Compliance
Requirements
The MoD publishes logistics and supply chain policy
in its Joint Services Publication (JSP) 886 [30]. It
mandates that the UOR support solution includes
spares support planning conducted using approved
inventory modelling tools. It also sets out the project
team’s responsibility for ensuring that appropriate
arrangements are made for the ranging, scaling, and
funding of spares, for identifying critical spares, for
ensuring that a manufacturer’s spares pack is
available to cover initial UOR support requirements,
and for ensuring that a contract is in place to cover
the longer-term supply of spares. Supply chain risks
and issues must be identified.
4 DEDUCTIONS: WHAT SHOULD BE
TARGETED FOR IMPROVEMENT?
It can be deduced that the aim should be to target
improvements to:
1. Achieve improved forecasting of spares demands,
thereby: contributing to a better use of strategic
transport methods with consequent cost benefits;
enabling the Control Tower and Force Primary Depot
to fulfil their purpose; assisting the project teams with
provisioning for UORs, thereby enabling them to
predict demand better, manage their suppliers better,
and be less vulnerable to the inventory supply risks
associated with small, specialist, suppliers.
2. Provide greater clarity on how the UOR supply
chain could be adversely affected by disruptive
events, natural or man-made, thereby enabling more
informed risk mitigation strategies to be
implemented, such as the holding of buffer stocks.
3. Provide greater clarity on the potential support
impacts of a change of UOR usage, and adverse
environmental effects, in order to enable better
informed risk mitigation strategies.
4. Provide something of utility to MoD commercial
officers, to enable them to be more commercially
astute, to make UOR support contractual judgements
from a better informed position, to comply with policy,
and to be well positioned to comply with the forward
depth support construct.
5. Enable UOR project teams to comply with JSP 886
policy.
6. Enable the MoD to respond to the NAO’s
observation on the incoherence of its logistics
information.
5 THE UOR SUPPORT MODEL
5.1 Building the Model
In building the UOR support model, identified above
as necessary for achieving the research objective, a
particular challenge had to be overcome: the
identification of, and access to, relevant UOR data, a
challenge the NAO has reported on. The solution was
to develop a fictitious, but representative, UOR
vehicle and use it as the basis for developing the data
the model would require. This would also get around
the security sensitivity of data associated with real
UOR equipment currently deployed. The case study
UOR system included a full system equipment
schedule, failure rates, appropriate preventive and
corrective maintenance actions, and a listing of the
spares required to enable such maintenance. The
Author developed the case study, drawing on his own
experience to inform the work, but ensuring that it
was validated independently. It was based on a
small, rotary wing, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). In
building the model, the options were broadly to
implement it using one of the simulation modelling
developer languages, or to utilize off-the-shelf
software. The decision was made to utilize the latter
because: the MoD’s Simulation Strategy [31]
emphasizes the use of off-the-shelf commercial
capability; it was considered that every effort should
be made to make the modelling process as
straightforward as possible in order to encourage its
wider use; and given the time imperative it made
sense to utilize readily available products.
5.2 Choosing the Modelling Products
The decision on which products to use was
influenced by what the candidates would be required
to model. This included operational scenarios, UOR
system operating and support locations,
maintenance and spares holding locations, supply
chain transit times, and transportation options. It also
included costs associated with all of these elements
and the support activities associated with an
equipment breakdown structure. The fictitious UOR
vehicle was developed to reflect a multi-indenture
system structure. The software needed to be able to
handle a multi-indenture, multi-echelon (MIME)
model where spares are allocated to multiple
locations (echeloning), and systems, subsystems,
components and parts (indenting) can be dealt with
as required. Selection of the software to utilize was
challenging because research revealed many
candidates with similar capabilities. It was not
possible in the time available to try them all. The final
decision was to select 4 products: WITNESS [32] a
product which was perceived to offer a general
purpose capability able to model the elements of
scenario, location, spares quantity and positioning,
transit times etc and thus deliver the output of UOR
equipment operational availability; SEER-H [33] a
product which was seen as primarily a cost model
and expected, therefore, to meet the support costs
output requirement; and OPUS10, used in
conjunction with SIMLOX [34], products which were
expected to deliver the outputs associated with
spares quantities and positioning, The fact that the
products were licensed for academic usage was also
a key influence on the decision.
5.3 Designing the Model – Objectives, Inputs,
Outputs and Content
The overarching project objective was: the
improvement of support to UORs in order to deliver
required operational availability whilst achieving
value-for-money. The focus in using WITNESS was
operational availability (Ao), this being the product of
the time a system is operating, or on standby for
operations, as a proportion of total time - made up of
operating and standby time, plus the time it is
undergoing maintenance and repair, plus the time it
is waiting for such repair. In SEER-H the focus was
on cost and cost drivers. The purpose was to gain an
indication of the magnitude and significance of
indicative cost changes, the result of adjusting the
model inputs. The rationale for selecting OPUS10
and SIMLOX was, broadly, that having modelled
operational availability and cost, OPUS10 would
enable both to be combined to see the indicative
cost-effectiveness of a range of stock solutions. With
OPUS10, for a given stock solution (i.e., a range and
scale of spares, positioned within a supply chain
structure), at a derived cost, you get a given level of
operational availability. SIMLOX brings the influence
of probabilities to the operational availability outputs
OPUS10 provides.
5.4 Verification and Validation
Verification and validation of the developed case
study system, and of the conceptual model that it
underpinned, was carried out by the MoD’s Support
Chain Optimization Team, in particular members of
the team who focused on helicopter platforms. As a
result of their observations, the model was adjusted
to reflect more realistic failure rates.
5.5 The Key Elements of the Model
The key elements of the model are described below,
and illustrated at Figure 2.
Some UAVs are deployed in Forward Operating
Bases (FOB) in Afghanistan where they are flown on
logistic replenishment missions. Operators carry out
basic servicing and lubrication tasks and maintainers
carry out simple inspection and repair tasks. This is
classed as 1st line support. UAVs which experience
failures beyond the scope of 1st line are transported
back to 2nd line at Camp Bastion. UAVs are also
deployed at Camp Bastion where they are used for
operator training and to provide a small theatre
reserve. The same 1st line tasks are carried out here
but, in addition, all 2nd line maintenance and repair
tasks – deeper and more complex than 1st line – are
carried out in the Camp Bastion Workshop. When
UAVs reach a set number of flying hours they are
returned to 3rd line (UK factory) for scheduled depth
maintenance. This applies to the major mechanical
subsystems such as the engine.
Figure 2: Key Elements of the Model.
Spares and consumables are stocked at the
manufacturer in UK, at the Bastion Workshop, and at
the FOBs. The manufacturer is currently the sole
supplier and ships spares and consumables into
theatre utilizing MoD-controlled strategic movement
assets and processes. Some UAVs are also
deployed in UK for pre-deployment training. The
training base is co-located with a combined 1st and
2nd line maintenance facility. UAVs from this training
fleet also go to 3rd line when they require scheduled
depth maintenance.
6 THE EXPERIMENTS
6.1 Designing the Simulation Experiments
The validity of the simulation experiments was
endorsed by a team of 8 MoD staff, both uniformed
and civilian, all of whom were engaged in equipment
acquisition, and several of whom had recent Iraq and
Afghanistan operational experience. A key focus of
the validation activity was the ‘base case’ as this
established the reference point for the comparative
analysis of subsequent experiments. The MoD team
was invited to adjust the variables in accordance with
changing operational and support scenarios which
they also validated. They were invited to review and
evaluate the outputs from each simulation run in
order to deduce the effects on support to the UOR
case study vehicle and make changes to the
variables for the next run. Their review of the outputs
concentrated on operational availability and costs,
but it also examined the support cost drivers and
other factors. Following each simulation experiment
it was possible to identify the changes to the variables
which offered most benefit and therefore identify
what could or should be implemented in ‘real life’. In
addition to the Base Case, 7 principal experiments
were carried out. These were selected by the 8 MoD
personnel as having most validity and potential value.
They are described below, together with some
observations on their results and their perceived
significance.
6.2 Change of UOR Usage Resulting in a 50%
Increase in Flying Hours (Experiment 1)
The Mastiff UOR illustrates the case for modelling a
change of usage for valid tactical reasons, when the
result is a reduction in operational availability. This
proved to be the outcome when it was modelled on
WITNESS to reflect a 50% increase in UAV flying
hours. The enhancements that would have to be
made to the support system in order to avoid this
reduction in availability were modelled on SEER-H.
The outcome was a set of indicative cost increases
that could be provided to the project team and to
commanders in theatre. The increased UAV usage
was modelled on OPUS10 and its output showed a
39% increase to spares cost to achieve a level of
operational availability that actually still fell short of
the Base Case desired level. This seems to say
something about where true value-for-money lies:
there would be little point in continuing to procure
spares to deliver only marginal availability benefits.
An addition to the OPUS10/SIMLOX based
experiment involved reducing the supply chain transit
time between the FOBs and the 2nd line workshop at
Camp Bastion in combination with the OPUS10 best
solution. This demonstrated that there is more
obvious benefit in combining smarter spares
procurement with other approaches such as reducing
supply chain pipeline times.
Using the tools in combination should enable the
UOR project team to model a range of alternative
mission profiles and usage patterns, using the results
to inform the funding bid in the main UOR business
case and to inform its risk management strategy. It
could use it to justify identifying alternative spares
and spares suppliers, potentially quite a wise course
given the limited production capacities of some of the
small, specialist UOR suppliers. It could also use it to
manage the seasonality that shapes enemy, and
therefore UK military, activity levels in theatre,
modelling increased activity levels to better inform
spares provisioning and positioning in theatre,
thereby supporting the MoD’s intent for the Control
Tower and Force Primary Depot.
6.3 Re-Deployment of UOR Systems
(Experiment 2)
Re-deploying UOR systems from UK to theatre in
order to counter the system’s reduced operational
availability has the appeal of being more responsive
than buying more systems from the manufacturer.
This might make it the logical choice for hard-pressed
commanders in theatre who want a quick solution to
reduced platform availability. The constrained
production capacity of the specialist small supplier
also makes buying more systems a less likely option,
as does the need to make the case for the purchase
against a change of usage that may be only
temporary, or seasonal. However, whilst the
WITNESS modelling suggested that re-deployment
might restore operational availability, it did not come
without cost. SEER-H indicated that these costs
might be comparatively small, but it should be borne
in mind that whilst it might be comparatively quicker
to re-deploy UK assets than to buy more, the
additional cost, and the logistic complexity, of putting
in place the increased spares, maintenance
capacities, transport provision, and storage and
handling capability that should accompany the re-
deployed assets might be prohibitive. Modelling the
option on a costing tool should enable the project
team to obtain indicative costs for enhancing existing
logistics support capability in theatre as an alternative
to the re-deployment of assets from UK. In this way,
it might be able to make a more convincing case for
not taking what would seem to be the logical decision.
6.4 Procurement of New Systems (Experiment 3)
The option of buying just 2 more systems was
modelled on WITNESS and this improved availability
by 11%, suggesting that modelling this option could
inform buy quantity if the decision is made to go down
this route. However, it would seem that the decision
should only be informed by the capabilities of
WITNESS used in conjunction with a costing tool like
SEER-H. Using the tools in combination this way
might enable the project team to refresh the UOR
business case successfully, remembering that HMT
usually only funds sufficient UORs for operations and
pre-deployment training.
6.5 The ‘Forward Depth’ Logistic Support
Construct (Experiment 4)
Modelling the forward depth support arrangement on
WITNESS and SEER-H generated quite impressive
results: an improvement in operational availability
(73% back up to 87%) and indicative savings of 30%.
However, once the MoD and the supplier are
committed to this support arrangement in an
operational theatre, it is likely to endure until the
operation is concluded. This may not sit easily with
the MoD’s wish for greater support contracting
flexibility, seeking value-for-money whilst retaining
the freedom to terminate support contracts at short
notice should the UOR be discontinued. The
modelling suggests that WITNESS and SEER-H,
used together, can enable these apparently
conflicting messages to be reconciled from a much
better informed position, helping commercial officers
to exercise the necessary ‘exceptional commercial
judgement’.
Although the NAO has observed that provisioning is
a greater challenge than operating the supply chain
pipeline [35][36], ‘forward depth’ cuts out much of the
uncertainty in the UK to theatre supply chain link,
making it less vulnerable to disruption by minimizing
its use or potentially removing it altogether.
Provisioning would also be helped because the
supplier is able to gauge more accurately the UOR’s
usage and support ‘reality’ on the ground. Positioning
the manufacturer at the first point of demand and
consumption would seem to satisfy the principle of
moving the information decoupling point as far
upstream in the supply chain as feasible [37] to
provide ‘rich’ demand information to the
manufacturer rather than the delayed, and probably
compromised (given the information coherence
problems the MoD supply chain currently suffers)
information that has to flow over the strategic link
from theatre to the UK.
There also appears to be value in modelling a more
generic approach to adjusting supply chain pipeline
times. What OPUS10 and SIMLOX indicated was
that for a given spares solution, implementing
measures to change pipeline times on a piecemeal
basis may not be the best approach, and that change
applied globally may be most cost effective. In this
way modelling on OPUS10 and SIMLOX, or similar
tools, appears to be a useful complement to the use
of general purpose and cost models. It would seem
to endorse the adoption of logistic support constructs
that address the supply chain more comprehensively
and enduringly. Adjusting individual links in the
supply chain would appear to have no such enduring
character and be vulnerable, therefore, to changing
operational and logistics priorities and the whims of
commanders.
6.6 Changes to Maintenance Turn-Around Times
(TAT) (Experiment 5)
Modelling changes to the turn-around times (TAT) of
specific subsystems, as was done on SEER-H,
should inform where any engineering changes, for
example to later variants of a UOR, would be most
profitably targeted. In an off-the-shelf system these
changes might be only minor but if they are made to
large, complex, expensive subsystems they might
nonetheless make financial sense. If measurement of
a TAT is deemed to include the time to get a UOR to
and from maintenance activity, then the associated
variables should offer more potential because they
contribute to supply chain pipeline times. Modelling
on WITNESS resulted in significant improvement to
operational availability (+14%), but this result should
be treated with caution. The experiment simulated a
50% reduction in TATs at all three lines of support,
across all the subsystems of the UAV, a scenario that
would have been very challenging to achieve in
practice. It would be likely to require the UOR system
to be given priority for workshop time and resources
over other systems. The supply chain in Afghanistan
is vulnerable, and to model on the basis of any
degree of certainty in reduced pipeline timings is
probably not a sound basis for provisioning,
positioning spares, and so on.
On OPUS10 and SIMLOX a more pragmatic
approach was taken: increasing TATs to reflect
pipeline vulnerability. Here there appears to be value
in modelling to mitigate operational supply chain risk.
The NAO identified strategic movement between UK
and operational theatres as an important contributor
to spares shortages. By simulating delays in strategic
movement by increasing TATs at 3rd line by a factor
of four, OPUS10 indicated not only the increased cost
of mitigating pipeline failure, but also the requirement
to double engine stocks to hold operational
availability at an acceptable level. It appears to be the
case that simulation modelling of this type can make
a useful contribution to UOR supply chain risk
management strategies.
6.7 Change of Failure Rates (Experiment 6)
The speed of a UOR procurement leaves little time
for system trials and testing and to some extent the
MoD has to rely on the manufacturer’s predicted
mean times between failures (MTBF). There is risk in
this, particularly for genuinely new capabilities and
with the uncertainty inherent in military operations.
The logic of modelling more pessimistic failure rates
led to Experiment 6 in which failure rate changes
were made to a variety of subsystems on OPUS10.
The effects of accelerated wear and tear, the result
of adverse environmental conditions, were simulated
for those subsystems that were considered to be
most vulnerable. The engine, with its rotating
mechanical components, was one such system. The
results suggested that it should be possible to
develop spares solutions that target those most
critical, rather than provisioning in a blanket fashion
to mitigate logistics risk.
Provisioning should address both spares quantity
and location. The UOR project team should be able
to use the modelling of failure rate changes to help
the MoD’s Control Tower do its job of balancing
spares availability in theatre with priorities for
strategic movement by air and surface. The modeller
does, however, need to understand what the
environmental effects are likely to be in order for the
modelling to be valid. This may have to wait until real
failure data has been collected in theatre, most likely
after the UOR has been fielded and has commenced
its sustaining support phase. The OPUS10 results
illustrate the fact that smarter spares procurement
and positioning might not provide the complete
answer. For the engine and for the chassis, despite a
49% and a 31% cost increase respectively,
availability still did not reach base case levels.
SIMLOX demonstrated how availability was quite
sensitive to failure rate changes. A UOR project
team, with such modelling outputs, should be able to
make the case that if availability is indeed critical, it
requires a more comprehensive approach to be
taken, probably including changes to the physical
‘laydown’ of logistics installations in theatre.
6.8 Application of Spares Off-the-Shelf
Satisfaction Rates (Experiment 7)
The value in modelling spares off-the-shelf
satisfaction rates (fill rates) was seen to lie in the
belief that, given the remit not to delay a UOR’s
deployment by deliberations over support, the quick
response, initial, UOR spares solution might well be
based on just such a simplistic policy. However, the
OPUS10 modelling illustrated that the high
expenditure incurred on spares to meet the imposed
fill rate (an additional 29%) did not guarantee an
increased availability and represented wasted
expense because availability actually levelled out.
More importantly perhaps, implementing the policy
would require that spares are re-supplied to theatre
on a sustained basis, thereby burdening an already
stretched supply chain both inter- and intra-theatre.
7 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
7.1 Balancing Quantitative and Qualitative
Factors
In reality, the decisions made during military
operations are shaped by many qualitative,
interpretive human influences. There has been much
media coverage of equipment shortages, particularly
those deemed to be safety-critical, and UORs are
prime candidates for such attention. It would seem
quite probable, therefore, that the MoD’s response to
a reduction in the operational availability of a UOR
may well include the imposition of questionable
blanket policies such as an expensive and logistically
demanding globally applied spares fill rate – despite
the modelling suggesting a better targeted approach.
Ideally, the positivist, quantitative, outputs from the
simulation modelling experiments need to be
complemented by some interpretivist subjectivity, the
application of qualitative ‘overrides’ that recognize
the less tangible aspects of operational reality. The
question of who the customer for the modelling is
arises here. It is easy to envisage the UK-based
modeller’s quantitative logic losing its objective force
as it is, metaphorically speaking, transported into the
operational theatre. This reinforces the well-
established principle that the modeller and the project
manager work together.
7.2 Owning the Problem and the Issues of
Influence and Control
According to Robinson [38] simulation modelling
should involve the client, the modeller, and domain
experts. However, in UOR support there may be
particular tensions between the client and the domain
experts. The UOR project team leader, nominally the
‘client’ and owner of the support problem, may be
able to use simulation modelling outputs to influence
the management of the balance between the forward
positioning of spares in theatre and the movement of
spares to theatre via strategic transport assets.
However, he may have little or no influence, and
probably no control, over the physical supply chain
itself, and particularly those parts of it in-theatre.
Therefore, the experiments which changed the
variables relating to supply chain pipeline times may
be of limited practical value to the owner of the
problem. The domain experts, principally those
people deployed on operations, may have a wide
variety of other pressures and priorities to manage.
The fact that military personnel serve operational tour
lengths of between 4.5 and 6 months adds the factor
of collective memory fade. Convincing arguments,
informed by simulation modelling, made before the
UOR’s initial deployment may be forgotten about a
few months later when people are addressing its
continuous, sustaining support.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE FURTHER
WORK
The aim of the research was to evaluate the utility of
commercially available simulation and modelling
tools used in conjunction with each other. There are
no doubt grounds for criticizing the final choice of
tools, and there are undoubtedly equally capable
alternatives. What mattered, however, was that the
benefits, or otherwise, could be evaluated broadly
and in this sense the actual costs, operational
availability percentages and so on, were not critical in
themselves; what mattered was the magnitude of the
changes they underwent as the variables were
adjusted. The cost outputs suggest that simulation
modelling of UOR support has the potential to
partially alleviate the NAO’s criticism that the
information gap results in MoD supply chain
management decisions not being informed by cost
considerations. It should enable a UOR project team
to conduct the spares planning, using approved
modelling tools, that the MoD mandates. It should
also enable the team to satisfy the requirement to
identify urgent, or critical, spares (e.g. engines). The
UAV experiments also seemed to endorse the value
of using a mix of modelling and simulation tools to
tackle a common Defence problem, the one which
Sleptchenko et al [39] modelled: to maximize system
availability given a fixed budget for spares and
maintenance capacity; and to minimize spending on
spares and maintenance capacity given a fixed
availability target. This suggests that the use of the
tools in this research meets the need for
‘generalizability’ i.e. that the results can be applied to
the support of UORs in general.
Based on the scale and scope of the UAV model, its
data, and the experiments conducted, it would seem
that the commercial products should meet the MoD’s
needs for simulation modelling that is quick and
effective to meet operational timescales [40]. The
tools seemed to be responsive and rapidly re-
configurable, as the MoD’s simulation strategy, and
its expeditionary posture, demand. Using the tools in
conjunction with each other was felt to be necessary
because no single tool delivers all the required
functionality. Arguably, to address a broad problem
such as improving logistic support to UORs, it was
not just feasible to use a variety of tools in conjunction
with each other but actually essential. Those selected
for the task seemed to perform well together.
The ideal would have been to be able to draw upon a
complete and comprehensive UOR data set, rather
than design and build a case study system from
scratch. That this was not achievable would be a fair
criticism of the research, although the NAO’s
observations on the poor level of data available to
them in their research [41] would perhaps soften the
criticism somewhat.
Ultimately, simulation modelling is an aid to decision
making and it should never be assumed to provide
the answer to any problem by itself. There would
seem to be a case for a more deliberate examination
of how the quantitative benefits of simulation
modelling are complemented by the qualitative
variables associated with military operations.
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